A modern analysis of the effects of site value taxation by Brueckner, Jan K.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/modernanalysisof1045brue

330
B385
1045 COPY 2
STX
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1045
A Modern Analysis of the Effects
of Site Value Taxation
Jan K. Srueckner
JHE LIBRARY OE JHB
JUL 6 1984
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1045
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
May 1984
A Modern Analysis of the Effects
of Site Value Taxation
Jan K. Brueckner, Associate Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
Formal analysis is generally absent from the previous literature
on the effects of site value taxation. This paper analyzes the
impacts of such a system (under which the property tax on improvements
is eliminated, with the tax burden shifted toward land) using standard
modern methods. Specifically, the analysis derives the long-run
impacts on the level of improvements, the value of land, and the price
of housing of a shift to a graded tax system (where the improvements
tax rate is lowered and the land tax rate is raised). The paper also
analyzes the incidence of the short-run windfall gains and losses which
result from gradation of the tax system.

The Effects of Site Value Taxation:
A Modern Analysis
by
Jan K. Brueckner
1. Introduction
Ever since the publication of Henry George's "Progress and
Poverty" in 1879, the possibility of using land value taxation as a
source of government revenue has intrigued economists and other social
commentators. While George's ideas have had little general impact,
land value taxation is practiced in Jamaica and in certain cities in
Australia and New Zealand, and graded property tax systems (where land
is taxed at a higher rate than improvements) are in use in some
Canadian provinces as well as in the city of Pittsburgh.
The literature dealing with land (or site) value taxation is vast
(for an excellent bibliography, see Carmean (1980)). Most writers have
been concerned with predicting the effects of a shift from a typical
property tax system, where land and improvements are taxed at the same
effective rate, to a system of pure site value taxation, where the
improvements tax is eliminated and land is taxed at a higher rate (tax
revenue is held constant). Others deal with the effects of transition
to a graded system (where the improvements tax rate is lowered but
remains positive), recognizing that pure site value taxation is simply
an extreme case of gradation. Consensus has emerged on a number of
points. First, nearly all writers agree that reduction or elimination
of the improvements tax will raise the level of improvements in the
long run, leading to more intensive land-use. Second, there is
agreement that in the short run, windfall gains and losses will result
from a movement to a graded system as tax bills rise for certain
properties and fall for others. The list of studies which attempt to
quantify such impacts includes Schaaf (1970), Smith (1970), Neuner et
al. (1974), Lusht (1975), Killoren and Casey (1981), and Stoddard and
Fry (undated). Third, the problem of generating accurate land value
assessments in the absence of frequent transactions in vacant land is
recognized by most writers (a practicing assessor (Back (1970))
claims that accuracy can be achieved). There is considerable interest
(but less agreement) regarding the impact of site value taxation on
speculation in vacant land,, with some commentators arguing that specu-
lation will be curbed by higher land holding costs while others predict
no effect (see 3rown (1927) for an early contribution). The best
general discussions of these and other points are provided by Becker
(1969), Harriss (1970), and Peterson (1978).
What is remarkable about this large literature is the almost
complete absence of modern analysis. Most studies rely on verbal
arguments or simple diagrams, and the few analytical efforts
(McCalmont (1976) and Cuddington (1978)) are marred by ad hoc assump-
tions or misplaced emphasis. While several correct predictions
regarding; the effect of site value taxation have been derived without
the aid of rigorous methods (the predicted increase in land-use inten-
sity, for example), the lack of precision of past studies has led to
substantial confusion on certain points. A prime example is the
auestion of land value impacts. As is shown below, a lower improve-
ments tax raises land value while a higher land tax lowers it. The
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net effect is ambiguous but depends in a straightforward way on the
magnitudes of various parameters. While the analysis underlying this
result is quite intuitive, only two authors (Becker (1969) and Harriss
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(1970)) correctly grasp the principle involved. Indeed, in his
recent contribution, McCalmont (1976) goes so far as to say that "not
even the direction, let alone the amount, of the change in land rent
can be ascertained from theory alone..." (p. 928). This claim is
false, as the ensuing analysis will demonstrate. Another important
question on which the literature is virtually silent is the impact of
site value taxation on housing prices. Modern analysis gives an
immediate answer, as will be seen below.
The remainder of this paper will elaborate on the above points by
conducting an analysis of the effects of site value taxation using
standard modern methods. Section 2 investigates the long run impacts
of a revenue-preserving shift from a standard property tax system to a
graded system under two different scenarios. In the first case, the
graded tax system is imposed in only a small part of a single city, so
that the price of housing is unaffected. In the second case, imple-
mentation occurs city-wide, so that price effects emerge. In both
cases, the analysis derives the impacts of gradation on the level of
improvements and the value of land. The impact on the price of
housing is also derived for the second case.
While Section 2 assumes that the price of housing is spatially
uniform, Section 3 allows spatial variation. In this setting, improve-
ments and land value vary with location, and short-run windfall gains
and losses result from a switch to a graded tax system. The analysis
-4-
is devoted to investigating the spatial pattern of gains and losses
under the assumption that the housing price contour is exogenous.
Section 4 of the paper briefly presents some empirical evidence rele-
vant to the predictions of the analysis, and Section 5 offers conclu-
sions.
2. Long-run effects
2.1 The case of an exogenous price of housing
In reality, property taxes are levied on a wide variety of types
of structures: residential, commercial, and industrial. Typically,
the interior space in one type of structure is unsuitable for any
other use. In the following analysis, this fact is ignored and the
property tax base is assumed to consist of a homogeneous class of
structures called "housing." In the model, housing floor space is
rented at price p per square foot and is produced using inputs of
capital (N) and land (J£) under a neoclassical constant returns tech-
nology represented by the production function H(N,£). Since output is
indeterminate under constant returns, the analysis focuses on levels
of output and capital input on a per-acre-of-land basis. Housing out-
put per acre is H(\T ,£)/Jl = H(N/£,1) = h(S), where S is capital per
acre of land (hereafter improvements per acre), a measure of land-use
intensity, and h(S) = H(S,1). Note that h* - H. > and h" = H-- <
by the concavity of H.
The net-of-tax rental prices of capital and land are represented
by i and r respectively, and the tax rates on improvements (capital)
and land are T and 9 respectively. The gross-of-tax capital and land
prices are therefore (1+T)i and (l+9)r respectively. Note that since
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taxes are expressed as a fraction of net rental price instead of
value, conversion to value terras would require multiplication of the
tax rates by the discount rate. Note also that T = 9 will hold under
a standard property tax system.
The shift to a graded property tax system is assumed to occur over
a land area of size I (referred to subsequently as the "tax zone").
Locational advantages are absent within the tax zone, so that the
housing price p is spatially uniform. Furthermore, in the initial
analysis, the tax zone is viewed as representing a small portion of the
relevant housing market. This means that the change in the tax system
will have a negligible effect on the total supply of housing in the
market, with the result that the price p can be viewed as exogenous.
Finally, given that the analysis deals with the effects of a localized
rather economy-wide tax change, the net return to capital is also taken
to be exogenous (the locality faces a perfectly elastic supply of
capital)
.
Profit per acre for a housing producer operating in the tax zone
is given by ph(S) - (l+x)iS - (l+9)r. The equilibrium conditions for
the producer require that profit per acre is maximal and that the
maximized value equals zero. The appropriate conditions are
ph'(S) = (1+T)i (1)
ph(S) - (l+x)iS - (l+8)r - 0. (2)
Together, eqs. (1) and (2) determine equilibrium values of improve-
ments per acre S and net land rent r. The impacts on S and r of
changes in the tax rates T and 8, which are used to derive the effects
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of a shift to a graded tax system, are computed by totally differen-
tiating the system (l)-(2). The results are
3t ph
H=° <*>
£-ift<° <»
By increasing the cost of capital, an increase in the improvements tax
rate T naturally reduces improvements per acre, as seen in (3). In
addition, by reducing the profitability of development, a higher
improvements tax depresses land rent, as seen in (5) (rent serves to
exhaust residual profit). Similarly, (6) shows that a higher land tax
rate depresses land rent. In fact, the higher tax is fully capital-
ized, so that gross-of-tax land cost remains unchanged ((6) yields
-jwT (l+8)r = 0). Finally, (4) indicates that a higher land tax rate
has no effect on the level of improvements.
The goal of the analysis is to derive the impacts on S and r of a
revenue-preserving shift to a graded tax system. Starting with a
standard tax system (where T = 9), gradation results from an increase
in 8 combined with a revenue-preserving change in T (pure site value
taxation emerges when T = 0). The first step in the derivation is the
computation of the derivative 3t/36, which gives the revenue-
preserving change in T accompanying an increase in 9. Noting that tax
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revenue originating from the tax zone equals £(xiS+9r), 3x/39 must
satisfy d(xiS+9r)/d9 = 0, or
3x
,„ . r 3S 3S 3x>> af dv , 3r 3x>, n ,_ N
Substituting from (3)-(6) and rearranging, (7) yields
Eliminating h" using the relationship
where a is the elasticity of substitution between capital and land in
3
housing production, and noting that land's factor share \i (which
equals (l+9)r£/pH) may be written (h-Sh')/h, (8) reduces to
11 = 21. h _ (1+B)to f 1 (10)
39 IS U (1+T)U ! ' UU;
Inspection of (11) shows that the sign of 3t/39 is ambiguous, so
that a revenue-preserving change in T may involve either a decrease or
an increase. The outcome depends crucially on the magnitude of the
elasticity of substitution, which, for given values of x, 9, and p.,
determines the sign of the expression in braces in (10). Inspection
of (10) indicates that for a sufficiently close to zero, 3x/39 will be
negative, while for a sufficiently large, 3x/39 will be positive. To
gain an intuitive understanding of this result, the first step is to
note that (10) equals minus the ratio of the derivative • of tax revenue
with respect to 9 (r+93r/39) and the derivative of revenue with respect
to x (iS + xi3S/3x + 93r/3x). Since the first derivative is always
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positive (revenue is always increasing in 9), the sign of 3x/39
depends on the sign of the latter derivative, which depends in turn on
two separate effects. First, since 3r/3x < by (5), an increase in T
indirectly depresses revenue from the land tax, making the last term in
the derivative negative. The effect of a higher x on improvements tax
revenue (captured by iS + xi3S/3x) is ambiguous, however, and depends
on the magnitude of a. A low (high) value of a means that improvements
tax revenue is increasing (decreasing) with T due to weak (strong)
substitution away from capital as T rises. When a is large, a higher
x therefore depresses revenue from both the improvements and land
taxes, cancelling the revenue gain from a higher 9. In this case,
3x/39 > must hold for revenue to remain constant. When a is suf-
ficiently small, however, the increase in improvements tax revenue
resulting from a higher T dominates the decline in land tax revenue,
and total revenue rises with T. In this case, t must fall as 8 rises
c.
to keep total revenue constant.
Whether 3x/39 is negative or positive for plausible values of o"
depends on the magnitudes of the other parameters in (10). To make
matters simple, suppose first that 3x/39 is evaluated under a standard
property tax system, so that x = 9 holds. In this case, the sign of
(10) is the same as the sign of a - (m /x). Focusing first on land's
share, published (or implied) estimates of u. range from 20% to 50%,
with most values lying in the middle or lower end of this range. In
addition, data compiled by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental
Relations (1983, Table 37) show that the average effective property
tax rate in the U.S. in 1981 for single family homes with FHA insured
mortgages was 1.26%. With a value-to-rent ratio between 10 and 20 (a
-9-
discount rate between 5% and 10%), this yields a T between 12% and 26%
(recall that T is the tax rate on net rent, not value). Together,
these u and T values imply that P./t lies between .8 and 4.2, with a
plausible value falling near the middle of this range. Since pub-
lished estimates of the elasticity of substitution in housing produc-
tion are almost always smaller than unity (see McDonald (1981) for a
survey), it follows that a - (u./t) is almost certainly negative,
implying 3x/39 < 0. This implication is welcome given that a positive
value for 3x/39 would be quite unnatural.
While the initial shift away from a standard property tax will
typically require a decline in T, the behavior of t as the rate falls
below 9 is harder to determine. If it could be shown that
d[(l+9)x/(l+x)ii ]/d9 < holds, then (assuming a constant a) the
expression in braces in (10) would remain positive as 9 rises away
from T, and 3t/39 < would hold globally. Unfortunately, the above
derivative is ambiguous in sign, so that the initial negativity of
3x/39 does not guarantee global negativity. Note, however, that for T
sufficiently close to zero, 3t/39 must be negative (see (10)). As a
result, it is safe to say that 3x/39 will be negative at the beginning
(t near 9) and at the end (x near zero) of a transition to pure site
value taxation. Intermediate cases may show 3t/39 > 0, although, as
mentioned earlier, this outcome would be most unnatural.
Having computed 3x/39, it is now possible to derive the impacts on
S and r of a shift to a graded property tax system. Since 3S/39 =
by (4), the impact on S is simply
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dS 8S 3t
d9 3x 39 * (11)
Given that 3S/3x < by (3), dS/d9 will be positive in the normal case
where 3t/39 is negative. This is the outcome recognized in the
earlier literature: a shift in the property tax burden toward land
Q
and away from improvements will raise the level of improvements.
While earlier writers were correct on this point, they typically
failed (as mentioned above) to appraise correctly a graded tax
system's effect on land value. The present analysis gives an imme-
diate answer since it follows (using (5), (6), and (10)) that
_dr_
m
_3r_ 3r 3t
d9 39 3t 39
Ar
(12)(1+9)(1-A) »
where A = ( l+9)xa/( l+x)u is the expression inside the braces in (10).
Since 3x/39 $ as 1 - A \ 0, (12) implies that
i|
>< as
-fl $ 0. (13)
In other words, land value (which is proportional to r) rises (falls)
with 9 when the revenue-preserving change in x is negative (positive).
In the intuitively sensible case where 3x/39 is everywhere negative,
this result implies that land value rises continuously as 9 increases,
reaching a maximum in the case of pure site value taxation.
Some understanding of these results can be gained by inspection of
the first line of (12). Since both 3r/39 and 3r/3x are negative, it
is clear that if a higher 9 requires a higher x to maintain tax reve-
nue (3x/39 > 0), then land value declines unambiguously, as indicated
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by the lower inequalities in (13). When 3x/39 < holds, however, a
lower improvements tax raises land value at the same time that the
higher land tax depresses it. While the net effect might appear to be
ambiguous (and was identified as such by those earlier writers astute
enough to recognize the trade-off involved), the mathematics unam-
biguously indicate that the impact of the lower improvements tax wins
out and land value rises. Consideration of the case where o = and
capital-land substitution does not occur makes this outcome somewhat
clearer. First, note from (10) that 3x/39 is closer to zero when a =
than when a > (3x/39 < is assumed). The reason is that when a > 0,
S increases in response to a lower x, which means that the revenue-
preserving decline in T must be greater than in the case where a =
and S is fixed. Next, note from (12) that when a = 0, dr/d9 - holds.
Since a revenue-preserving tax change thus leaves r unchanged when
a=0, and since constant revenue requires a faster decline in t when
o > 0, the value-increasing effect of a lower T must dominate in the
latter case, leading to an increase in r. This surprising conclusion,
which establishes that transfer of the tax burden from improvements to
land actually raises land value, shows the usefulness of modern
analysis applied to the present problem.
Summing up, the above analysis has shown that for representative
parameter values, an initial shift away from a standard property tax
system toward a graded system will lead to an increase in both im-
provements per acre and land value. Provided that 3x/39 < continues
to hold as 9 increases, the initial impacts are simply magnified as
the tax burden on land increases, with improvements per acre and land
-12-
value eventually reaching a maximum under a system of pure site value
taxation.
2.2 The case of an endogenous price of housing
In this section, the tax zone is assumed to encompass the entire
housing market. The assumption that locational advantages are absent
9
is maintained, however. In this case, a change in the property tax
system will have an impact on the price of housing, and a market-
clearing equation must be added to the previous equilibrium system
(l)-(2). Letting D(p) denote the aggregate demand function for
housing, which satisfies D'
_<_ 0, the expanded equilibrium system con-
sists of the earlier equations together with
Th(S) = D(p). (14)
The separate impacts of T and 8 on p, S, and r are derived by
totally differentiating (1), (2), and (14). The results are given by
(4), (6), and
ft-
(ThZD? >0 (15)
ph" + Uh f /D')
|f-- ^-5 <0 (17)
ph" + Uh» /D')
9r h3p/3x - iS > n / 18 n
-37
=
1+9 <°
(18)
As before, a higher land tax is fully capitalized (leaving (l+9)r
unchanged) and has no effect on S. As a result, there is no impact on
-13-
p, as shown in (16). A higher improvements tax once again lowers the
level of improvements (see (17)), but its effect on land rent is ambig-
uous, as shown in (18). The latter result is due to the fact that the
improvements tax is shifted forward, raising the price of housing (see
(15)). Since the higher p tends to increase the profitability of
development at the same time that the higher T reduces it, the net
impact on r is indeterminate. This outcome makes 3r/3r numerically
larger than before (compare (18) and (5)), and comparison of (17) and (3)
shows that 3S/3t is also larger (less negative) in the present case.
This follows from the stimulating effect of a higher p, which moder-
ates the decline in S resulting from the higher improvements tax.
Substituting the above results in (7) to compute 3f/39 yields
3t . -r ,. (1+8)t1 + (eThh'/D') !-!
, 1Q .
d lb S[ph"+Uh' /D')]
To simplify (19), let n = (p/h)(3h/3p) = -h' /hh" > represent the
elasticity of housing supply per acre of land. Also, let
e = pD
'
/D = pD'/£h < represent the elasticity of housing demand.
Substituting n and e together with a and y. into (19), the equation
reduces to
Al-ZLh a[(l+9)i£+8(l+T)] r 1 / 0M n
38 ~ is [1 " (u-Du^e-n) ' * U0;
To see that the earlier solution for 3t/39 is just a special case of
(20), note that (20) reduces to (10) when e •* -« (when p is
exogenous). While the sign of 3x/39 is again ambiguous, it is easy to
see that (20) is negative whenever the corresponding derivative in
-14-
(10) is negative. To establish this fact, note first that the expres-
sion in braces in (20) is greater than the corresponding expression in
12
(10). When the latter expression is positive (implying 3x/39 < in
the p-exogenous case), it follows that the expression in (20) is a
greater positive quantity, implying that 3f/39 from (20) is negative
but less in absolute value than (10). Therefore, when 3t/39 is nega-
tive in the p-exogenous case, the p-endogenous derivative is also
negative but closer to zero. The reason for this result is that the
expressions in (10) and (20) are proportional to the derivative of tax
revenue with respect to T. Since 3S/3T and 3r/3x are both larger in
the p-endogenous case, tax revenue responds more vigorously to a change
in T. In the case where revenue increases with T in the p-exogenous
case, it increases at a faster rate when p is endogenous, meaning that
13
a smaller decrease in T is needed to keep revenue constant as 9 rises.
Computation of the impacts of a switch to a graded tax system pro-
ceeds as before. First, since 3p/39 = 0, it follows that
i2.ai2.il (21)
d9 3t 39 ' v '
which (noting (15)) is negative as long as 3t/39 < 0. Since a higher
9 has no impact on p while a lower t reduces it, the total effect of
gradation is to reduce the price of housing. In addition, since 3S/39
again equals zero, dS/d9 is again given by (11). Therefore, the level
of improvements again increases with 9 provided that 3t/39 is nega-
tive. Upon substituting (6), (18), and (20) into the first line of
(12) to compute dr/d9, simplification yields the result
-15-
dr
=
g[l+T(l+e)] r .
d6 (l+T)u
z
(e-n) 1 - A' ' K }
where 1 - A' is the expression in braces in (20). When 1 - A' > 0, so
that 3t/39 < 0, the sign of (22) is the same as the sign of -[l+x(l+e)],
which depends in turn on the magnitude of e. If housing demand is
inelastic, so that -1 <_ e
_<_ 0, then 1 + t(l+e) > and dr/d9 < 0.
When demand is elastic, 1 + x(l+e) can have either sign, with
1 + t(l+e) ^ holding as e ^ -(l+(l/x)). Substituting a representative
x value of .20 to appraise the effect of an initial shift toward a
graded tax system, it follows that dr/d9 ^ as e ) -6. Since most
estimates indicate that housing demand is price inelastic (see Mayo
(1981) for a survey), dr/d9 < seems the likely outcome. Note that
as t falls toward zero, the case against dr/d9 > is even stronger
(demand would have to be even more elastic in order for the inequality
14
to hold). As a result, it appears that dr/d9 is globally negative.
This result is clearly the opposite of the outcome in the p-
exogenous case (where land value rises), and the explanation lies in
the behavior of the housing price. Since p falls with 9 in the
present situation, a new force which reduces the profitability of
development (and hence the value of land) enters the analysis. Since
it may be shown that the price of housing falls faster with 9 the less
elastic is the demand for housing (the absolute value of dp/d9 is
larger when e is closer to zero), the specific results above become
clearer. Inelastic or moderately elastic demand leads to a sharp
decline in p and a correspondingly large depressing effect on r. This
effect, which was not present before, is sufficient to reverse the
previous outcome and lead to a decline in land value. When demand is
-16-
highly elastic, the decline in p is moderate and the depressing effect
on r is not sufficiently strong to reverse the earlier positive
impact, so that land value rises.
Summing up, the preceding analysis has shown that when 3t/39 is
negative, an increase in 9 depresses the price of housing, raises the
level of improvements, and, as long as housing demand is not highly
elastic, depresses the value of land. The maximum impacts will be
observed when a system of pure site value taxation is reached. While
the sign of 3x/39 is generally ambiguous, so that the above conclu-
sions cannot be viewed as automatic, 3x/39 < seems natural. In any
case, since it was shown that 3x/39 evaluated at T = 9 is almost cer-
tainly negative in the p-exogenous case, and since negativity implies
that 3t/39 < also holds for T = 9 when p is endogenous (see above),
we can conclude with a high degree of confidence that starting with a
standard property tax system, the initial shift toward a graded system
will have the impacts listed above.
3. An analysis of temporary gains and losses
In long run equilibrium, housing producers are indifferent to the
features of the property tax system since profit is identically zero.
Before full market adjustment occurs, however, producers can experi-
ence windfall gains or losses from a change in the tax system. While
the uniformity of land-use within the tax zone means that such gains
and losses will never emerge in the model of Section 2, land-use
heterogeneity within the zone '(differences in improvements per acre
and land values) will generally lead to windfalls. The purpose of
this section is to present a stylized analysis of such windfalls using
-17-
a model where the price of housing (and thus the levels of S and r)
varies within the tax zone.
Without loss of generality, the tax zone is taken to be a rec-
tangle of unit width, and the price of housing p is assumed to be a
decreasing function of distance x from one end of the rectangle
(3p/3x < 0). This could reflect the impact of differential commuting
costs within the tax zone or the influence of an amenity or disamenity
near the zone. The housing price function is taken to be exogenous.
The first step in the analysis is to deduce the spatial behavior of S
and r implied by spatial variation in p. This is done by totally dif-
ferentiating (1) and (2) with respect to x, which yields
11= dSLp. < o (23)
3x ph 3x
dx 1+9 dx
indicating that both improvements per acre and land value decline
with x (these results are familiar from urban spatial analysis). The
levels of S and r prevailing prior to a change in the tax system will
be denoted S and r. While S and r are implicitly functions of x, the x
argument will be suppressed for simplicity in the analysis.
The analysis investigates the effect of a shift to a graded prop-
erty tax system over both short- and medium-run horizons. The feature
which is common to both the short and medium run is that improvements
per acre at any given location are fixed at the level prevailing prior
to the change in the tax system (S is fixed at S). This is a reflec-
tion of the longevity of housing capital, which makes an immediate
-18-
response to a tax change uneconomical. What distinguishes the short-
and medium-run cases is that in the short run, the assessed value of
land will remain at its previous level, whereas in the medium run, the
effects of reassessment will emerge. In both cases, however, land
cost net of the tax liability will remain fixed at r, reflecting the
fact that payments on existing mortgages will be unaffected by a
change in the tax system.
Since revenue per acre (ph(S)) and net-of-tax improvements and
land costs (iS and r) will remain fixed in the short and medium run,
gains and losses will be due entirely to changes in tax liabilities.
To analyze the short-run case, the first step is to note that the tax
payment at a given location equals TiS + 9r and that total revenue
b_ b_
from the tax zone is given by xi J Sdx + 9 J rdx, where b is the length
_
b_
of the zone (recall that its width is unity). Letting S = J Sdx/bA
denote the average level of improvements per acre in the zone, with
r defined analogously, tax revenue is given by £.(xiS.+9r.) (note
A A A
b = £). Constancy of total tax revenue then requires
4§- -< 0. (25)
3
"A
To find the short-run change in the tax liability at a particular
location, (25) is substituted into iS3x/39 + r, yielding
S"[(7/S")-(TA/S"A)].
(26)
Eq. (26) indicates that parcels with high ratios of land value to
improvements face higher taxes as 9 rises and x falls, with taxes
declining for parcels with low r/S ratios. Note that if land-use is
-19-
uniform within the tax zone, so that r = r and S = S , then (26) is
zero and the tax liability is unchanged at each location.
The spatial pattern of gains and losses is deduced by taking the
derivative of r/S with respect to x. Calculations based on (23) and
(24) yield
87/?
_
(l-q)h 3p
3x 1+9 3x' K }
indicating that the expression in parentheses in (26) is an increasing
(decreasing) function of x as a \ 1. In the realistic case where
a < 1, this implies that (26) is positive (negative) for low (high)
values of x ((26) must change sign in order for tax revenue to remain
constant). Therefore, windfall losses (higher taxes) accrue to par-
cels with low x's while windfall gains (lower taxes) accrue to parcels
with high x's. A shift to a graded property tax system thus imposes
short-run losses on the most intensively developed parcels while
bestowing short-run gains on the least intensively developed sites.
This result might at first appear counterintuitive since parcels with
high improvements per acre stand the most to gain from a lower improve-
ments tax. This observation, however, ignores the fact that such par-
cels also have high land value, which makes an increase in 9 especially
burdensome. When a < 1, the latter effect dominates and the total tax
liability rises.
Although the above analysis applies to a tax zone with a single
type of real estate, the conclusions based on (26) apply even in the
case of mixed land uses. That is, regardless of what types of prop-
erty are located in the tax zone, comparison of the r/S ratio for a
-20-
given parcel to the ratio of average values for the zone tells whether
taxes rise or fall for that parcel in the short run. Using this prin-
ciple, the impact analyses cited in the introduction attempt to pre-
dict the short-run incidence of a shift to pure site value taxation
for various municipalities. Typical findings show that many com-
mercial and industrial properties would face higher taxes, while
single family homes would generally benefit from lower tax bills.
As mentioned above, the difference between the short and medium
run is that land will be reassessed for tax purposes in the latter
case. Reassessment will reflect land's market value, which is based
on the profitability of new development. Specifically, value will be
given by the r solution to (l)-(2) with S freely variable, even though
improvements are currently frozen at S. With reassessment, the tax
liability becomes TiS + 8r, and total revenue from the tax zone is
b
given by TiS I + 9 / rdx. Using (5) and (6) to compute 8t/89 yields aA
solution identical to (25), so that 3t/39 is the same regardless of
whether or not land is reassessed. The tax change for a given parcel
is now d(xiS + 9r)/d6, which, using (5), (6), and (25), reduces to
(26) divided by (1+9), implying that the change in the post-
reassessment tax liability is proportional to the change in the pre-
reassessment liability (absolute post-reassessment changes are some-
what smaller). As a result, the previous conclusions hold for the
medium-run case: parcels with high (low) r/S ratios face higher
(lower) post-reassessment taxes, with the losers (gainers) being
located at low (high) x values. It is interesting to note that since
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dr/d9 may be shown to be exactly the negative of the tax change, post-
reassessment land values fall where values are high (at low x's) and
rise where they are low (at high x's).
Summing up, the analysis in this section has shown that a shift to
a graded property tax system will generate temporary gains and losses
in a distinct spatial pattern. Provided that a < 1, the most inten-
sively developed parcels will suffer windfall losses as their tax
liabilities rise while the least intensively developed sites reap
windfall gains in the form of lower tax bills. This pattern holds
both before and after land is reassessed.
4. Empirical evidence
The ideal empirical test of the predictions of the long-run analysis
of Section 2 would rely on a cross-section regression relating the level
of one of the endogenous variables (p, S, or r) in various cities to a
measure of the extent of gradation of the city's property tax system as
well as other explanatory variables. The rarity of graded tax systems,
however, means that the data for such an exercise is simply unavail-
able. A less reliable but nevertheless suggestive test would involve a
comparison of the features of two cities whose underlying charac-
teristics are identical except for the presence of a graded property
tax system in one and a standard system in the other. Archer (1972)
presents what seems to be the only such comparison in the existing
literature. The data he offers allow comparison of the level of improve-
ments per acre in the downtown parts of the Australian cities of Sydney
(where pure site value taxation has been in use in 1916) and Melbourne
(which has a standard property tax system). Archer is careful to
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recognize the importance of holding other things equal in making such a
comparison, and he notes that the two cities have nearly identical size
populations and downtown work forces. Table 1 reproduces Archer's
table (1972, p. 32) listing the distribution of downtown building
heights in the two cities.
Building Height
vacant site
building in construction
ground floor only
2 floors
3 floors
4 floors
5 floors
6 floors
7 floors
8 floors plus
Table 1
Sydney Melbourne
1 1
3
3 3
2 8
2 1
1 9
7
6 5
64 42
Total 4 sites and
78 buildings
1 site and
75 buildings
Inspection of the table shows that a greater proportion of Sydney
buildings fall in the 8-f loors-plus category, confirming the predic-
tion that site value taxation leads to a higher level of improvements
per acre. Unfortunately, Archer does not present data which would
allow testing of the theory's predictions regarding land values and
housing prices.
5. Conclusion
This paper has presented rigorous analysis of two of the principal
issues treated by the previous literature on site value taxation:
long run effects and the incidence of short term gains and losses.
The long-run analysis established that when a graded property tax
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system is instituted over an area small enough so that the price of
housing is unaffected, two distinct effects emerge in the normal case
where 3t/39 < 0: the level of improvements per acre rises, as does
the value of land. The increase in land value is a surprising result
given that gradation of the tax system increases the tax burden on
land. When the tax zone is large enough so that gradation affects the
price of housing, the outcome is somewhat different. Improvements per
acre still rise when 3t/39 < 0, but this is accompanied by a decline in
the price of housing coupled with a decline in the value of land, with
the latter effect emerging as long as housing demand is not highly
elastic. While the impact of gradation on the level of improvements
was well understood in the earlier literature, the predictions relating
to land values and the price of housing are entirely new.
The contribution of the short-run analysis is to show that the
windfall gains and losses which result from gradation of the tax
system have a rather surprising spatial incidence. Contrary to a com-
mon impression, the most intensively developed parcels suffer windfall
losses in the form of higher taxes, while the least intensively devel-
oped parcels benefit from windfall gains.
It must be pointed out that a principal limitation of the analysis
in this paper is its partial equilibrium nature. For example, as a
result of the implicit assumption that landlords are absentee (see
footnote 9), the analysis in Section 2.2 fails to capture the impact
of changes in rental income on the demand for housing. Although a
general equilibrium model would capture such feedbacks, it is an open
question whether the type of analysis done in this paper would be
tractable in such a framework.
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Finally, it should be noted that the paper has been silent on the
normative question of whether a shift to a graded property tax system
(or adoption of pure site value taxation) would be desirable. The
answer to this question, however, is implicit in the optimal tax
literature (see Sandmo (1976)) and affirms Henry George's original
claim. Specifically, a principal lesson of optimal tax theory is that
efficiency requires tax rates to be inversely related to demand (or in
the case of inputs, supply) elasticities. When the relevant elasticity
for a given commodity is zero, as in the case of land supply, it is
optimal for society's tax burden to be carried by that commodity alone.
As a result, modern theory vindicates George's belief in the efficiency
of site value taxation.
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Footnotes
Lent (1967) provides a complete list of countries using variants
of land value taxation. Holland (1969) gives a lengthy description of
the institutional aspects of Jamaica's tax system, while Breckenf ield
(1983) discusses Pittsburgh's system.
2
Turvey (1955) also claims that the impact of site value taxation
on land values is ambiguous, but his reasoning is unclear.
3
This expression results from rewriting a = H..H„/H ~H in terms of
the function h.
^Using (6), 38r/39 = r/(l+8) > 0.
5
Using (3), 3TiS/3t = IS(l-Ta/(l+T)y ).
Another way of expressing this result is that a necessary (but not
a sufficient) condition for 3f/39 < to hold is that the relevant
range of the improvements tax "Laffer curve" is upward sloping.
Direct M£ estimates can be found in Richman (1965), Gottlieb
(1969), and Harriss (1970). Implied U£ estimates can be computed from
data contained in the impact studies cited in the introduction.
Q
Pollock and Shoup (1977) provide an empirical estimate of the
magnitude of the impact on improvements using a model which posits a
value for 3x/39 and makes use of a particular parameterization of eq.
(1).
9 —
Since I is exogenous, the analysis ignores the possibility that
a change in the tax system could affect the spatial size of the city.
Analysis of such an effect, which requires use of a monocentric city
model, unfortunately proved to be intractable.
The fact that housing demand does not depend on net land rent r
(which determines the income of land owners) reflects the implicit
assumption that land owners are absentee, living outside the tax zone.
Note that 3h/3p = h'3S/3p, with 3S/3p = -h*/ph" from (1).
12
The difference between the two expressions equals
-U+e)(n+l)aT/(l+T)u (e-n) > 0.
13
When revenue decreases with t in the p-exogenous case, revenue
can either increase or decrease with T when p is endogenous, yielding
an ambiguous sign for 3t/36.
14
When A' < 0, so that 3x/39 > 0, this conclusion is reversed.
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In the long run, the outcome in the present framework is similar
to previous results. If the expression in the denominator of (10) is
positive at each x, 3t/38 < holds and dS/d9 > is satisfied for all
x. Although dr/d9 can have either sign at a given location, total
land value in the tax zone rises with 8 provided 9x/39 < 0.
Since the analysis requires tax revenue to be held fixed, a
substantial public spending difference between the cities (which is
unlikely in any case) would invalidate its predictions.
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